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CARPOOLING LIABILITY?:  
APPLYING TORT LAW PRINCIPLES 
TO THE JOINT EMERGENCE OF SELF-DRIVING 
AUTOMOBILES AND TRANSPORTATION 
NETWORK COMPANIES 
Jacob D. Walpert* 
 
Self-driving automobiles have emerged as the future of vehicular travel, 
but this innovation is not developing in isolation.  Simultaneously, the 
popularity of transportation network companies functioning as ride-hailing 
and ride-sharing services have altered traditional conceptions of personal 
transportation.  Technology companies, conventional automakers, and 
start-up businesses each play significant roles in fundamentally 
transforming transportation methods. 
These transformations raise numerous liability questions.  Specifically, 
the emergence of self-driving vehicles and transportation network 
companies create uncertainty for the application of tort law’s negligence 
standard.  This Note addresses technological innovations in vehicular 
transportation and their accompanying legislative and regulatory 
developments.  Then, this Note discusses the implications for vicarious 
liability for vehicle owners, duties of care for vehicle operators, and 
corresponding insurance regimes.  This Note also considers theoretical 
justifications for tort concepts including enterprise liability.  Accounting for 
the inevitable uncertainty in applying tort law to new invention, this Note 
proposes a strict and vicarious liability regime with corresponding no-fault 
automobile insurance. 
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INTRODUCTION 
It is 2045, and New York residents have not personally driven 
automobiles in over a decade.  Moreover, few people privately own 
automobiles.  To commute to work in New York City, a suburban resident 
uses her smartphone to hail a vehicle from a ride-sharing service.1  The 
vehicle that arrives to transport her is fully autonomous, without the 
components of traditional automobiles:  no steering wheel, turn signal, 
pedals, or mirrors.2  It is raining and dark in the early morning.  During the 
ride, she catches up on messages while her vehicle maintains proper speed, 
obeys every traffic sign and signal, and otherwise drives like a reasonably 
prudent person.3 
The self-driving vehicle then arrives in Manhattan and awaits a right turn.  
Simultaneously, a hurried pedestrian commuter crosses that same 
intersection but does so negligently—outside of the crosswalk—in an 
attempt to beat the light.  The light turns green.  Visibility is poor, and 
because of the pedestrian’s rush, the vehicle’s artificial intelligence system 
fails to read her movements properly and incorporate them into its complex 
 
 1. See Chris Martin & Joe Ryan, Super-Cheap Driverless Cabs to Kick Mass Transit to 
the Curb, BLOOMBERG:  TECH. (Oct. 24, 2016, 7:01 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/ 
news/articles/2016-10-24/super-cheap-driverless-taxis-may-kick-mass-transit-to-the-curb 
[https://perma.cc/A5KR-UWQK]. 
 2. See infra notes 37–38 and accompanying text. 
 3. See infra Part II.D (discussing the standard of care for drivers under traditional 
negligence principles). 
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driving calculations.  The self-driving vehicle collides with the pedestrian, 
severely injuring him.  Litigation ensues.4 
The benefits of self-driving-automobile and ride-sharing technology are 
easy to conceptualize:  increased safety,5 decreased energy costs, new uses 
for commuting time, and greater mobility for those unable to drive.6  
However, as these advantages continue to evolve, so too will the costs, 
including diminished freedom and privacy and potential ambiguous 
liability.7  From a legal perspective, emerging automobile technology 
incorporates many interrelated issues in artificial intelligence, federal and 
state regulation, legislation, tort liability, and insurance.8  To date, state 
legislatures and the federal government have focused on regulatory issues 
concerning metrics for safety, licensing, and testing, but they have failed to 
address adequately questions of tort liability and insurance.9 
Within the context of automobile accident liability, this Note considers 
the significance of the combined emergence of ride-sharing services and 
fully autonomous self-driving vehicles in reshaping the nature of private 
vehicle ownership and driver control.  Accordingly, it aims to answer the 
following questions with far-reaching implications for courts and 
statehouses:  What tort scheme is appropriate for this imminent 
phenomenon?  Is modern tort jurisprudence sufficient to guide judges who 
will preside over accident litigation in the future?  How should legislatures 
faced with the proliferation of self-driving vehicles and ride-sharing alter 
current law?  The answers to these questions will be critical for automobile 
and technology industry stakeholders, as well as individual vehicle owners 
and drivers.  Moreover, in considering socially optimal outcomes, liability 
concerns may present significant deterrents to technological development, 
 
 4. Under current law, New York courts would likely hold that the pedestrian was 
contributorily negligent but only a small percentage at fault for purposes of apportioning 
liability. See Kane v. United States, 189 F. Supp. 2d 40, 51–52 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).  In Kane, a 
pedestrian commuter sued under the Federal Tort Claims Act when she was hit crossing a 
New York City street by a U.S. Postal Service truck. Id. at 44, 52.  The court held that the 
truck driver failed to exercise reasonable care and was 90 percent at fault, while the 
pedestrian failed to exercise reasonable care and was 10 percent at fault. Id. at 53. 
 5. See Mike Ramsey, Self-Driving Cars Could Cut Down on Accidents, Study Says, 
WALL ST. J. (Mar. 5, 2015, 12:17 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/self-driving-cars-could-
cut-down-on-accidents-study-says-1425567905 (“[S]elf-driving vehicles could eliminate 
90% of all auto accidents in the U.S., prevent up to $190 billion in damages and health-costs 
annually and save thousands of lives . . . .”) [https://perma.cc/85G4-6CJP]. 
 6. See Robert P. Denaro et al., Automated Vehicle Technology:  Ten Research Areas to 
Follow, TR NEWS, May–June 2014, at 19, 19. 
 7. See generally Jack Boeglin, Note, The Costs of Self-Driving Cars:  Reconciling 
Freedom and Privacy with Tort Liability in Autonomous Vehicle Regulation, 17 YALE J.L. & 
TECH. 171 (2015) (providing a potential plan for regulators to reconcile freedom and privacy 
with tort liability in autonomous vehicle regulations). 
 8. For more on these issues, see infra note 274.  This Note incorporates regulatory 
developments and newly enacted state laws but does not focus on regulatory challenges 
associated with self-driving automobiles and transportation networking companies.  
Moreover, distinct legal issues in artificial intelligence, see, e.g., Ryan Calo, Robotics and 
the Lessons of Cyberlaw, 103 CALIF. L. REV. 513 (2015), are beyond the scope of this Note. 
 9. See infra Part I.C. 
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even when they provide safety benefits in comparison to traditional 
transportation methods.10 
Self-driving technology is not an independent innovation; rather, it is 
uniquely intertwined with changes created by transportation network 
companies (TNCs).11  However, there is a lack of scholarship concerning 
the interaction between these two interrelated transportation 
advancements.12  Accordingly, this Note compares tort regimes to 
determine what kind of accident liability system best accounts for the 
changing nature of vehicle ownership and control implicated by the 
combined emergence of these two transportation developments.  This Note 
provides a solution that considers three related concerns:  (1) ideal societal 
outcomes reflecting the costs and benefits of emerging technology and 
sustained development, (2) careful application of existing liability regimes 
to innovation, and (3) feasible answers for courts and legislatures.13  From 
these concerns, this Note incorporates elements of enterprise liability to 
propose a strict and vicarious liability system with no-fault automobile 
insurance.14 
This Note has three primary parts.  Part I explains the emergence of self-
driving automobiles and discusses current technological and legal 
developments.  Further, Part I traces the technological evolution and 
suggests ways in which that evolution may continue together with TNCs to 
create a new transportation paradigm.  Finally, Part I reviews legislative and 
regulatory developments in response to self-driving vehicles and TNCs.  
Part II explains tort law’s application to automobile accidents and theories 
of recovery.  Then, Part II identifies and compares various automobile 
accident liability regimes in the United States, incorporating analysis of 
motor vehicle statutes relating to vicarious liability for owners, driver 
negligence, and insurance law alternatives.  Focusing on the potential 
consequences of new innovations for the application of tort law, Part III 
analyzes previous scholarship and commentary on the legal questions that 
the emergence of self-driving vehicles implicates.  Lastly, Part III provides 
a resolution suggesting important aspects of tort jurisprudence and statutory 
insurance law that are best suited to self-driving automobiles with limited 
private ownership created by ride-sharing. 
 
 10. See Gary E. Marchant & Rachel A. Lindor, The Coming Collision Between 
Autonomous Vehicles and the Liability System, 52 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1321, 1322 (2012) 
(assessing legal liability as a potentially limiting consideration for manufacturers of 
autonomous vehicles). 
 11. See infra Part I.A.2 (explaining transportation network companies and the increasing 
popularity of their services). 
 12. See infra Part III.A. 
 13. See infra Part III.B. 
 14. See infra Part III.B. 
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I.  THE EMERGING PARADIGM:  
PRESENT AND FUTURE VEHICULAR TRANSPORTATION 
Over the past decade, self-driving technology has been gradually 
introduced to the roadways.  This part provides the foundation of self-
driving vehicle development necessary to understand reactions of 
transportation stakeholders, legal responses to technological innovation, and 
legal issues presented by these technologies.  It then discusses modern 
developments, including the efforts of traditional automakers and 
technology enterprises and TNCs’ creation of a transportation model that 
may lead to reductions in vehicle ownership.  Finally, this part outlines the 
legislative and regulatory responses to address self-driving vehicles and 
legal issues that have arisen in the ride-sharing context. 
A.  Origins of Self-Driving Vehicles 
Initially, the motivation to develop self-driving automobiles arose from 
national security interests.15  The goal was to create unmanned vehicles for 
the military.16  In 2004, the Pentagon’s Defense Advanced Research 
Projects Agency (DARPA) challenged innovators to create self-driving 
vehicles capable of driving across the Mojave Desert.17  No competitor 
finished the 142-mile course; the top-scoring vehicle traveled less than 8 
miles.18  Just three years later, DARPA conducted a competition with traffic 
signals and obstacles in a simulated city, and six out of the eleven teams 
successfully completed the test.19 
The technology behind self-driving vehicles is highly advanced, but in its 
simplest form, self-driving vehicles use detailed maps and sensor 
information to determine their location and how to act.20  Sensors detect 
objects around the vehicle and software classifies those objects based on 
movement patterns, sizes, and shapes.21  The sophisticated software uses 
predictive technology to project how objects around the vehicle will 
 
 15. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Def., The DARPA Grand Challenge:  Ten Years 
Later (Mar. 13, 2014), http://www.dod.mil/pubs/foi/Reading_Room/DARPA/15-F-0059 
_DOC_22_NEWS_GC_10_YRS_LATER.pdf [https://perma.cc/4BCD-P5A7].  This initial 
motivation mirrors the original impetus for the Internet. See Barry M. Leiner et al., Brief 
History of the Internet, INTERNET SOC’Y 2 (Oct. 15, 2012), http://www.internetsociety.org/ 
sites/default/files/Brief_History_of_the_Internet.pdf [https://perma.cc/M58L-2B8Y]. 
 16. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Def., supra note 15. (“The longer-term aim was to 
accelerate development of [autonomous vehicles] that could ultimately substitute for men 
and women in hazardous military operations, such as supply convoys.”). 
 17. See id. 
 18. See id.  DARPA held another competition the next year, where five vehicles out of 
195 teams completed the course. Id. 
 19. See id. 
 20. See generally Technology, WAYMO, https://waymo.com/tech/ (last visited Feb. 16, 
2017) [https://perma.cc/P326-3XXD]. 
 21. See id. 
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move.22  Finally, the vehicle’s software chooses its course of action based 
on its surroundings and relevant circumstances.23 
Using an early version of this technology, the winner of the second 
DARPA challenge was a Stanford University team led by Sebastian Thrun, 
a Google engineer and coinventor of the company’s “Street View” mapping 
service.24  Along with Google cofounder Larry Page, Thrun and his 
engineering team were early promoters of self-driving vehicles’ potential to 
lower energy costs and make highways safer.25  Accordingly, the 
technology industry became a key participant in self-driving development.26 
B.  Modern Transportation Developments 
A decade after the first DARPA challenge, transformative automobile 
technology is becoming mainstream.27  Google was a pioneer in self-
driving vehicle development, but the company used Toyota and Audi 
vehicles to test its autonomous technology.28  However, recognizing the 
potential for industry upheaval as self-driving technology becomes the 
norm,29 automakers have begun developing their own self-driving 
vehicles.30 
1.  Traditional Automakers 
Compete with Silicon Valley 
Toyota, the world’s largest automaker, was slow to embrace self-driving 
technology but has now significantly invested in robotics and artificial 
 
 22. See id.  For example, the software might predict that a pedestrian standing at a 
crosswalk is waiting to cross the street. 
 23. See id.  Circumstances include, for example, road work, closed lanes, railroad-
crossing indicators, and cyclists’ hand signals. Id. 
 24. See John Markoff, Google Cars Drive Themselves, in Traffic, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 9, 
2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/10/science/10google.html [https://perma.cc/RT8E-
9SXV]. 
 25. See id. (noting “Dr. Thrun sounds like an evangelist when he speaks of robot cars” 
and the technology’s potential to “reduce fuel consumption” and “reduce[] [the] possibility 
of accidents”). 
 26. See Ujjayini Bose, Note, The Black Box Solution to Autonomous Liability, 92 WASH. 
U. L. REV. 1325, 1328 (2015) (describing how Google’s participation in the DARPA 
challenges spurred its desire to develop self-driving vehicles for the public). 
 27. Ten years after the original challenge, DARPA noted that “defense and commercial 
applications [for self-driving vehicles] are proliferating.  The rapid evolution of the 
technology [is] being driven by the information technology and automotive industries, 
academic and research institutions, the Defense Department . . . and federal and state 
transportation agencies.” Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Def., supra note 15. 
 28. See Bose, supra note 26, at 1329. 
 29. See Yoko Kubota, Behind Toyota’s Late Shift into Self-Driving Cars, WALL ST. J. 
(Jan. 12, 2016, 8:43 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/behind-toyotas-late-shift-into-self-
driving-cars-1452649436 (observing that “traditional car makers fear software makers will 
steal the auto’s soul and profitability”) [https://perma.cc/F5YD-HWBV]. 
 30. See Roberto Baldwin, Automakers Are Beating Silicon Valley at Its Own Game, 
ENGADGET (Oct. 19, 2016), https://www.engadget.com/2016/10/19/automakers-are-beating-
silicon-valley-at-its-own-game/ (arguing that traditional automakers are surpassing the 
efforts of technology companies in producing self-driving vehicles) [https://perma.cc/6ZPR-
B34C]. 
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intelligence to make self-driving vehicles by 2020.31  Likewise, Volvo has 
announced plans to offer optional $10,000 premium autopilot features that 
permit users to disengage from driving completely, but the vehicle’s 
steering wheel will continue to allow physical driving.32  While not a 
traditional automaker, electric-car specialist Tesla offers limited autopilot in 
some vehicles through autosteer, lane-departure warning, and emergency 
braking safety features.33  However, drivers are required to keep their hands 
on the wheel and prepare to take control when necessary.34  In October 
2016, Tesla announced that it will equip all vehicles with hardware that 
allows for eventual fully autonomous driving.35 
Other automakers are developing the technology in alternative ways.  For 
example, Ford concentrates on taxi services, announcing its “intent to have 
a high-volume, fully autonomous . . . vehicle in commercial operation in 
2021 in a ride-hailing or ride-sharing service.”36  Ford expects these 
vehicles to be entirely driverless, with no steering wheels or pedals.37  
Similarly, Google—initially focused on software—plans to build self-
driving vehicles without steering wheels or pedals, designed to operate 
without human intervention.38 
 
 31. See Kubota, supra note 29.  Toyota’s President Akio Toyoda declared that he 
“wouldn’t trust an autonomously operating vehicle until one could beat a human-driven car 
around the Nürburgring racecourse in Germany.” Id.  Fellow Japanese automaker Nissan 
also hopes to offer fully autonomous vehicles by 2020. Id. 
 32. See Keith Naughton, Volvo Plans to Offer Fully Self-Driving Car to Luxury Buyers, 
BLOOMBERG:  TECH. (Sept. 29, 2016, 12:35 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/ 
2016-09-29/volvo-plans-to-offer-fully-self-driving-car-to-luxury-buyers [https://perma.cc/Q 
WG3-88ZW]. 
 33. See Kate Greene, Life in Google’s Self-Driving City, CONSUMER REP. (Sept. 6, 
2016), http://www.consumerreports.org/cars-life-in-googles-self-driving-city/ [https:// 
perma.cc/XN5R-8ZBM]. 
 34. See Naughton, supra note 32.  Tesla considers its self-driving capabilities to be level 
2 autonomy, while others believe Tesla’s autopilot is level 3. See Jordan Golson, Volvo 
Autonomous Car Engineer Calls Tesla’s Autopilot a ‘Wannabe,’ VERGE (Apr. 27, 2016, 4:45 
PM), http://www.theverge.com/2016/4/27/11518826/volvo-tesla-autopilot-autonomous-self-
driving-car [https://perma.cc/LJ2R-FDWY].  For an explanation of autonomy levels, see 
infra notes 93–94 and accompanying text. 
 35. See Keith Laing, Tesla Again Scrambles the Self-Driving Debate, DET. NEWS (Oct. 
27, 2016, 11:30 PM), http://www.detroitnews.com/story/business/autos/2016/10/27/tesla-
scrambles-self-driving-debate/92866300/ [https://perma.cc/BF66-VFLV]. 
 36. Press Release, Ford Motor Co., Ford Targets Fully Autonomous Vehicle for Ride 
Sharing in 2021; Invests in New Tech Companies, Doubles Silicon Valley Team (Aug. 16, 
2016), https://media.ford.com/content/fordmedia/fna/us/en/news/2016/08/16/ford-targets-
fully-autonomous-vehicle-for-ride-sharing-in-2021.html [https://perma.cc/HB86-4MB5]. 
 37. See Russ Mitchell, Ford Reveals Self-Driving Cars; Politeness May Be a Problem, 
L.A. TIMES (Sept. 13, 2016, 4:20 AM), http://www.latimes.com/business/autos/la-fi-hy-ford-
self-driving-20160913-snap-story.html [https://perma.cc/BNX2-DGTC]. 
 38. See Amy Levine, Can I Be Held Negligent If My Self-Driving Car Causes an 
Accident?, INS. J. (Apr. 20, 2015), http://www.insurancejournal.com/magazines/features/ 
2015/04/20/364411.htm (“Unlike an airplane operating on autopilot mode, which still 
requires the pilots to account for unanticipated objects in the sky and regain control of the 
aircraft when necessary, the ‘operator’ of this model of self-driving car would not even have 
the opportunity to intervene in the driving of the vehicle.”) [https://perma.cc/BJR6-5J2T].  
Further, Google’s parent company spun off its autonomous vehicle project to operate as a 
stand-alone business called Waymo, signaling confidence in the technology’s ability to be 
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2.  Participation of Transportation Network Companies 
In Fall 2016, Uber, a TNC39 and the world’s most valuable start-up,40 
began deploying self-driving vehicles in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania.41  
Several months later, Uber expanded its pilot program to Arizona42 after 
encountering regulatory pushback when introducing the service in San 
Francisco, California.43  Like Google, Uber wants to refine how self-driving 
vehicles behave in real surroundings, which include interactions between 
these vehicles and their passengers.44  Drivers’ natural behaviors and social 
cues are critical because they contribute to subtle driving culture, which 
varies by neighborhood, city, state, and region.45  Ultimately, Uber is 
counting on fully autonomous vehicles to transform the economics of ride-
hailing by eliminating its largest cost:  drivers.46 
 
commercially viable rather than simply research-oriented. See Daisuke Wakabayashi, 
Google Parent Company Spins Off Self-Driving Car Business, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 13, 2016), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/13/technology/google-parent-company-spins-off-waymo-
self-driving-car-business.html [https://perma.cc/9XY2-38NB]. 
 39. TNCs are variously referred to as ride-sharing, ride-hailing, or ride-sourcing 
services.  A discussion of the specific distinctions between these terms and how they differ 
from traditional taxi services is outside the scope of this Note.  TNCs are nonetheless 
highlighted because they reflect broader trends in vehicle ownership and thus have important 
implications for liability.  As first defined for regulation by the California Public Utilities 
Commission, TNCs use online-enabled platforms to connect passengers with drivers using 
their personal, noncommercial vehicles. Press Release, Cal. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, CPUC 
Establishes Rules for Transportation Network Companies (Sept. 19, 2013), 
http://docs.cpuc.ca.gov/PublishedDocs/Published/G000/M077/K132/77132276.PDF 
[https://perma.cc/WC4A-ZKVK]; see also Tomio Geron, California Becomes First State to 
Regulate Ridesharing Services Lyft, Sidecar, UberX, FORBES (Sept. 19, 2013, 3:40 PM), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/tomiogeron/2013/09/19/california-becomes-first-state-to-
regulate-ridesharing-services-lyft-sidecar-uberx [https://perma.cc/6GHZ-ZXG4]. 
 40. See Alison Griswold, Uber’s Self-Driving Cars Are Already Getting into Scrapes on 
the Streets of Pittsburgh, QUARTZ (Oct. 4, 2016), http://qz.com/798092/a-self-driving-uber-
car-went-the-wrong-way-on-a-one-way-street-in-pittsburgh/ (stating that Uber has a $68 
billion valuation) [https://perma.cc/5B79-PYDJ]. 
 41. See Aarti Shahani, Uber to Roll Out Self-Driving Cars in Pittsburgh, NPR  
(Aug. 20, 2016), https://ww2.kqed.org/news/2016/08/20/uber-to-roll-out-self-driving-cars-in-
pittsburgh/ [https://perma.cc/M6QZ-DU8U].  Weather is one reason that Uber has rolled out 
its research in Pittsburgh; the city has four seasons, unlike the occasionally rainy Silicon 
Valley. See Signe Brewster, Uber Starts Self-Driving Car Pickups in Pittsburgh, 
TECHCRUNCH (Sept. 14, 2016), https://techcrunch.com/2016/09/14/1386711/ [https:// 
perma.cc/H9T9-PF2A].  It is also an older city, with an irregular grid, bridges, and many 
potholes. See id. 
 42. See Eric Newcomer & Ellen Huet, Uber Ships Self-Driving Cars to Arizona After 
California Ban, BLOOMBERG:  TECH (Dec. 22, 2016, 4:02 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/ 
news/articles/2016-12-22/uber-pulls-self-driving-cars-from-california-for-arizona (“The 
California Department of Motor Vehicles banned Uber’s self-driving cars from San 
Francisco . . . just days after they first deployed.  In response, Uber picked up and moved [to 
Arizona].”) [https://perma.cc/9BJT-5LUD]. 
 43. See id.; see also Press Release, Uber, San Francisco, Your Self-Driving Uber Is 
Arriving Now (Dec. 14, 2016), https://newsroom.uber.com/san-francisco-your-self-driving-
uber-is-arriving-now/ [https://perma.cc/4M3U-KNQC]. 
 44. See Brewster, supra note 41. 
 45. See Greene, supra note 33. 
 46. See Griswold, supra note 40.  Uber lost over $1.2 billion in the first half of 2016, 
mostly due to subsidies spent on drivers. See Eric Newcomer, Uber Loses at Least $1.2 
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Uber envisions a world of transportation where its vehicles make the 
required complex driving maneuvers while transporting passengers without 
the need for drivers, thereby operating more efficiently.47  Accordingly, the 
increased popularity and customer reliance on services provided by Uber 
and its competitors, as well as vehicle-sharing services like Zipcar, have 
become disruptive forces in the automotive industry at the same time as the 
emergence of self-driving technology.48 
As traditional automakers have begun to invest in self-driving vehicles, 
so too have they recognized that the technology-driven future of 
automobiles will involve transportation without car ownership.49  Thus, 
Toyota has invested in Uber, and Volkswagen has invested in Gett, a 
competitor popular in Europe.50  Additionally, BMW and Mercedes-Benz 
have started to develop their own ride services.51  Likewise, Lyft—Uber’s 
largest American competitor52—plans to transport customers in self-driving 
vehicles within the next year through a partnership with General Motors.53  
Lyft pledges that more than half of rides offered through their service will 
be autonomous by 2021, but more significantly, the company proclaims that 
“[b]y 2025, private car ownership will all-but end in major U.S. cities” due 
to self-driving vehicles.54 
3.  Vehicle Ownership Trends 
Although the claim is ambitious,55 the potential end to private vehicle 
ownership is reflected in various trends.  According to a 2014 study, 
American households without a vehicle have increased nearly every year 
 
Billion in First Half of 2016, BLOOMBERG:  TECH (Aug. 25, 2016, 8:00 AM), https:// 
www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-08-25/uber-loses-at-least-1-2-billion-in-first-half-
of-2016 [https://perma.cc/UA2T-3AGK]. 
 47. See Mike Isaac, Uber Bets on Artificial Intelligence with Acquisition and New Lab, 
N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 5, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/05/technology/uber-bets-on-
artificial-intelligence-with-acquisition-and-new-lab.html (reporting on Uber’s acquisition of 
an artificial intelligence company and the importance that technology companies place on 
artificial intelligence) [https://perma.cc/CK5V-KUX6]. 
 48. See Mike Isaac & Neal E. Boudette, Automakers Befriend Start-Ups Like Uber, 
Girding Against a Changing Car Culture, N.Y. TIMES (May 24, 2016), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/25/technology/uber-gett-ridesharing-toyota-vw.html 
[https://perma.cc/B537-6G7R]. 
 49. See id. 
 50. See id. 
 51. See id. 
 52. David Gelles & Mike Isaac, Lyft Is Said to Seek a Buyer, Without Success, N.Y. 
TIMES (Aug. 19, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/20/technology/lyft-is-said-to-fail-
to-find-a-buyer-despite-talks-with-several-companies.html [https://perma.cc/LS6N-7DDR]. 
 53. See Isaac & Boudette, supra note 48 (noting that General Motors invested $500 
million in Lyft). 
 54. See John Zimmer, The Third Transportation Revolution, MEDIUM (Sept. 18, 2016), 
https://medium.com/@johnzimmer/the-third-transportation-revolution-27860f05fa91#.ibu0 
c5dwh [https://perma.cc/2E5J-8VDQ]. 
 55. See Victor Luckerson, Lyft’s 10-Year Driverless Car Plan Is a Pipe Dream, RINGER (Sept. 
26, 2016), https://theringer.com/lyfts-10-year-driverless-car-plan-is-a-pipe-dream-6d6e87 
f7c375#.oh7hmmgmt [https://perma.cc/KD63-6RGC]. 
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since 2007.56  Moreover, the proportion of households without a vehicle 
increased in twenty-one of the thirty largest American cities.57  In a 
subsequent study, the same institute found a continuous decrease in the 
percentage of individuals under age forty-five with a license.58  
Specifically, about 87 percent of nineteen-year-olds in 1983 held licenses, 
but that figure dropped to 69 percent thirty years later.59 
As the percentage of new vehicles sold to eighteen- to thirty-four-year-
olds has dropped significantly, many argue that a slowed economy 
dissuades younger people from investing in a car.60  However, evidence 
shows that millennials’ “interests and priorities have been redefined in the 
last two decades, pushing cars to the side while must-have personal 
technology products take up the fast lane.”61  Accordingly, the combination 
of younger generations’ distaste for automobile ownership, decreased desire 
for licenses, preference for personal technology products, and widespread 
use of smartphone applications have created a unique opportunity for TNCs 
and self-driving vehicles.62 
 
 56. See Hitchin’ a Ride:  Fewer Americans Have Their Own Vehicle, U. MICH. (Jan. 23, 
2014), http://ns.umich.edu/new/releases/21923-hitchin-a-ride-fewer-americans-have-their-
own-vehicle [https://perma.cc/Z7VJ-2N5Q]. 
 57. See id. 
 58. See More Americans of All Ages Spurning Driver’s Licenses, U. MICH. 
(Jan. 20, 2016), http://www.umtri.umich.edu/what-were-doing/news/more-americans-all-
ages-spurning-drivers-licenses [https://perma.cc/LZ7T-CBBG]. 
 59. See id. (“Other teen driving groups have also declined:  18-year-olds fell from 80 
percent in 1983 to 60 percent in 2014, 17-year-olds decreased from 69 percent to 45 percent, 
and 16-year-olds plummeted from 46 percent to 24 percent.”). 
 60. See Darren Ross, Millennials Don’t Care About Owning Cars, and Car Makers 
Can’t Figure Out Why, FAST COMPANY (Mar. 26, 2014, 10:16 AM), https:// 
www.fastcoexist.com/3027876/millennials-dont-care-about-owning-cars-and-car-makers-
cant-figure-out-why [https://perma.cc/3R9B-M4XZ]. 
 61. Id. 
 62. This generational shift may include future products like Lynk & Co’s vehicle, a 
“smartphone on wheels” that is a “fully-connected digital car built for young people who live 
in megacities.” See Máté Petrány, Lynk & Co Wants to Build a Car You’ll Love as Much as 
Your Smartphone, ROAD & TRACK (Oct. 21, 2016), http://www.roadandtrack.com/new-
cars/future-cars/a31258/lynk-co-first-chinese-car-in-america-usa/ [https://perma.cc/T7V9-
9ZHB].  The vehicle “is designed to perform a remarkable trick:  Whenever you won’t be 
driving it for a while, you can [share it].  Your vehicle’s availability is posted on a social 
network . . . .  For someone to borrow your car, they simply reserve it, walk up, and unlock 
the vehicle with their phone using a Lynk & Co app.” See Mark Wilson, Hate Owning a 
Car?:  This New SUV Is Designed to Be Shared, FAST COMPANY (Oct. 19, 2016, 6:50 PM), 
https://www.fastcodesign.com/3064786/hate-owning-a-car-this-new-suv-is-designed-to-be-
shared [https://perma.cc/CCT7-7TC6]; see also Markoff, supra note 24 (discussing the 
prospect that self-driving technology will “allow the cars to be summoned electronically, so 
that people could share them.”).  Moreover, “[f]ewer cars would then be needed, reducing 
the need for parking spaces, which consume valuable land.” Id.  Thus, self-driving vehicle 
lessees and owners will be able to rent their cars to others when they are not using them, 
providing vehicles without traditional ownership burdens. 
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C.  Legislative and Regulatory Responses 
In an industry with laws that date back to an era of horse-drawn 
carriages,63 developments in engineering and technology are part of a 
broader automotive ecosystem that requires detailed legislative and 
regulatory schemes. 
As these transformational shifts alter personal transportation, inevitably, 
accidents occur that affect human lives.  In fact, in February 2016, Google’s 
self-driving project caused its first accident.64  Although Google’s vehicles 
had previously been involved in collisions, this incident was the first time 
the company’s software was likely at fault.65  Likewise, TNCs have been 
involved in fatal accidents resulting in greater focus on liability and 
insurance coverage issues.66  Accordingly, states and the federal 
government have sought to address issues arising both from self-driving 
vehicles and TNCs.  Legislative and regulatory developments are relevant 
to this Note because they implicate critical details about the variation 
among states in tort liability and insurance plans. 
1.  Self-Driving Vehicles 
As a result of lobbying by Google,67 in 2012, Nevada became the first 
state to pass legislation and approve an autonomous vehicle license, thus 
 
 63. See John Markoff, Google Lobbies Nevada to Allow Self-Driving Cars, N.Y. TIMES 
(May 10, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/11/science/11drive.html [https:// 
perma.cc/85KG-UZJD]. 
 64. See Alex Davies, Google’s Self-Driving Car Caused Its First Crash, WIRED (Feb. 
29, 2016, 2:04 PM), https://www.wired.com/2016/02/googles-self-driving-car-may-caused-
first-crash/ (describing that the crash occurred when the self-driving vehicle changed lanes to 
get around a storm drain’s sand-bagged perimeter and moved into the path of an approaching 
bus) [https://perma.cc/D3M3-DL9Q]. 
 65. See id.  Other collisions occurred when human drivers rear-end self-driving vehicles.  
Over the first six years of Google’s project, the company’s vehicles were involved in 
fourteen minor accidents, including eleven rear-enders. See Charlie Osbourne, Google’s 
Autonomous Car Injuries:  Blame the Human, ZDNET (July 17, 2015, 7:27 PM), 
http://www.zdnet.com/article/googles-autonomous-car-injuries-blame-the-human/ [https:// 
perma.cc/G5QW-KFZ9].  Later in 2016, a Tesla was involved in the first fatal accident 
involving a self-driving vehicle, with the crash serving as a sign that the technology might 
not be as advanced as proponents have suggested. See Bill Vlasic & Neal E. Boudette, Self-
Driving Tesla Was Involved in Fatal Crash, U.S. Says, N.Y. TIMES  
(June 30, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/01/business/self-driving-tesla-fatal-crash-
investigation.html [https://perma.cc/K5E6-NTWS].  The fatality occurred when a tractor-
trailer made a left turn in front of a Tesla, and the vehicle failed to apply the brakes despite 
being in autopilot. Id.  Tesla asserted that neither autopilot nor the driver noticed the tractor-
trailer’s white side against a bright sky, so brakes were not applied. Id. 
 66. See R.J. Lehmann, Blurred Lines:  Insurance Challenges in the Ride-Sharing 
Market, R STREET INST. 5 (Oct. 2014), http://www.rstreet.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/ 
RSTREET28.pdf [https://perma.cc/F4NK-TQ36].  In 2014, Uber was sued by the father of a 
six-year-old girl who died after being hit by an Uber driver, but Uber stated that the driver 
was not providing services at the time.  The lawsuit challenged TNCs’ “assertion that they 
are not liable for accidents experienced by [their] drivers.” Id. 
 67. See Markoff, supra note 63.  Although Google’s reason for focusing its initial 
lobbying efforts on Nevada is unclear, it may be due to the state’s lower insurance costs. See 
Bose, supra note 26, at 1330 n.36. 
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allowing their legal operation on public roads.68  Several other jurisdictions 
followed in the same year with legislation, including California,69  the 
District of Columbia,70 and Florida.71  To date, thirty-four states have 
considered legislation related to autonomous vehicles, with nine states and 
the Washington, D.C., passing such legislation.72 
State legislation continues to expand.  Florida’s 2012 statute declared a 
legislative intent to encourage the safe development, testing, and operation 
of autonomous vehicle technology;73 the state’s 2016 legislation not only 
expands the permissible operation of autonomous vehicles, but it eliminates 
testing requirements and, significantly, the formerly mandated presence of a 
driver.74 
Pursuant to statutory authority, some state agencies have promulgated 
regulations relating to self-driving vehicles.75  Nevada’s Department of 
Motor Vehicles defines “autonomous vehicle,”76 establishes a distinct 
driver’s license endorsement,77 and specifies operation, safety, testing, and 
certification requirements.78  Other states’ regulations have defined 
autonomous vehicles using similar language.79  Likewise, regulations 
comparably define operators or drivers of autonomous vehicles, either as an 
individual who “causes the autonomous vehicle to engage”80 or the “human 
operator” of the autonomous vehicle.81  At the same time, state regulations 
 
 68. See Bose, supra note 26, at 1330; Mary Slosson, Google Gets First Self-Driven Car 
License in Nevada, REUTERS (May 8, 2012, 6:39 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/uk-
usa-nevada-google-idUSLNE84701320120508 [https://perma.cc/8RBG-J4JS]. 
 69. See CAL. VEH. CODE § 38750 (West 2012) (amended 2015). 
 70. See D.C. CODE § 50-2352 (Supp. 2014).  Washington D.C.’s initial statutory 
enactment provides an example of the basic nature of early autonomous vehicle legislation.  
It states: 
An autonomous vehicle may operate on a public roadway; provided, that the 
vehicle:  (1) Has a manual override feature that allows a driver to assume control 
of the autonomous vehicle at any time; (2) Has a driver seated in the control seat of 
the vehicle while in operation who is prepared to take control of the autonomous 
vehicle at any moment; and (3) Is capable of operating in compliance with the 
District’s applicable traffic laws and motor vehicle laws and traffic control 
devices. 
Id. 
 71. See FLA. STAT. § 319.145 (2012) (amended 2016). 
 72. See Autonomous/Self-Driving Vehicles Legislation, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES 
(Dec. 12, 2016), http://www.ncsl.org/research/transportation/autonomous-vehicles-
legislation.aspx [https://perma.cc/E2QH-DGF7]. 
 73. See id. 
 74. See id. 
 75. See id. 
 76. NEV. ADMIN. CODE § 482A.010 (2016) (interpreting the term “autonomous vehicle” 
to exclude a vehicle enabled with a safety or driver assistance system “unless the vehicle is 
also enabled with artificial intelligence and technology that allows the vehicle to carry out all 
the mechanical operations of driving without the active control or continuous monitoring of 
a natural person.”). 
 77. Id.§ 482A.040. 
 78. See generally id. §§ 482A.110–.180. 
 79. See Bose, supra note 26, at 1331. 
 80. NEV. ADMIN. CODE § 482A.020. 
 81. D.C. CODE § 50-2351 (Supp. 2014).  
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vary in several significant ways, including requirements for licensing, 
insurance, and safety features.82 
The federal government has also addressed the rise of self-driving 
vehicles.  In 2013, the Department of Transportation’s National Highway 
Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) released plans for research on 
safety-related issues and recommendations to states for testing, licensing, 
and regulating automated vehicles.83  Specifically, NHTSA’s statement 
addressed (1) an explanation of areas of vehicle innovation and types of 
automation that offer potential for reductions in crashes and deaths, (2) a 
summary of NHSTA research to help ensure that all safety issues related to 
vehicle automation are explored, and (3) recommendations to states that 
have authorized operation of self-driving vehicles on how to ensure safe 
operation as these new concepts are being tested.84 
In early 2016, the NHTSA noted the “rapid development of emerging 
automation technologies means that partially and fully automated vehicles 
are nearing the point at which widespread deployment is feasible.”85  
Subsequently, in September 2016, the Department of Transportation 
released its federal policy for automated vehicles.86  A recognized expert on 
self-driving vehicle legality suggested the policy’s significance: 
[T]his guidance will be the starting point for more thoughtful legislative 
discussions—not only at the state level but also, for the first time, at the 
federal level. . . .  This soft guidance could become even more influential 
if states incorporate it in legislation, if [NHTSA] considers it in the course 
of exemption or enforcement decisions, or if courts look to it to 
understand how a reasonable developer should act.87 
The updated federal policy addresses important aspects of self-driving 
vehicles, including traffic laws that vary by state88 and gaps in current 
regulations for tort liability and insurance.89  According to the policy, 
because states are responsible for determining liability and insurance rules, 
 
 82. See Bose, supra note 26, at 1331. 
 83. See generally Policy Statement, Nat’l Highway Traffic Safety Admin., Preliminary 
Statement of Policy Concerning Automated Vehicles (2013). 
 84. See id. at 2. 
 85. Policy Statement, Nat’l Highway Traffic Safety Admin, 2016 Update to 
“Preliminary Statement of Policy Concerning Automated Vehicles” 1 (2016). 
 86. See generally NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., 
FEDERAL AUTOMATED VEHICLES POLICY:  ACCELERATING THE NEXT REVOLUTION IN 
ROADWAY SAFETY (2016). 
 87. Bryant Walker Smith, US Department of Transportation’s Automated Driving 
Guidance, CTR. INTERNET & SOC’Y (Sept. 19, 2016, 5:00 PM), http:// 
cyberlaw.stanford.edu/blog/2016/09/us-department-transportations-automated-driving-
guidance [https://perma.cc/M2HP-3Y2X].  Smith also addressed the NHTSA policy’s 
enforceability:  “The model state policy does not bind states, and some may well decide not 
to follow it.  The performance guidance likewise does not bind developers of automated 
driving systems, but I would expect few of these developers to deviate from it.” Id. 
 88. See NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., supra note 86, at 25–26.  Self-driving 
vehicles should be able to follow applicable laws, including “speed limits, traffic control 
devices, one-way streets, access restrictions (e.g., crosswalks, bike lanes), U-turns, right-on-
red situations, metering ramps, and other traffic circumstances and situations.” Id. 
 89. See id. at 44. 
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they should consider how to allocate liability among owners, operators, 
passengers, and manufacturers when a crash occurs.90  Additionally, as 
these issues involve human lives, the policy warns that laws allocating 
liability could have significant effects on consumer acceptance, deployment 
rates, and insurance costs.91 
Finally, federal policy adopts SAE International’s92 standardized 
definitions for degrees of automation, which places self-driving vehicles on 
a 0–5 scale.93  Levels 0–2 and 3–5 are distinguished based on whether the 
human operator or the automated system is primarily responsible for 
monitoring the driving environment, with the term “highly automated 
vehicle” representing level 3–5 vehicles.94  Degrees of automation are 
relevant in determining the tort duties that individuals who “operate” self-
driving vehicles owe.95 
2.  Transportation Network Companies 
TNCs have disrupted traditional transportation offerings by providing 
services through application-based platforms, where customers use 
smartphones to request rides.96  The applications function by connecting 
customers with nearby drivers using GPS technology.97  Generally, drivers 
do not have commercial licenses and drive privately owned vehicles with 
personal automobile insurance.98  This arrangement has raised issues for 
ride-sharing service regulations, including the extent to which TNCs can be 
held liable for claims including unfair competition, breach of contract, and 
drivers’ tortious behavior.99  Specifically, much of the regulatory 
 
 90. See id. at 45; see also infra Part II. 
 91. See NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., supra note 86, at 46. 
 92. SAE International is an association of engineers and technical experts in aerospace, 
automotive, and commercial-vehicle industries. See SAE INT’L, http://www.sae.org/about/ 
[https://perma.cc/5UR6-2E2F].  To simplify communication and facilitate collaboration 
within technical and policy domains, the organization issued common terminology for 
automated driving. See NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., supra note 86, at 103 n.4. 
 93. NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., supra note 86, at 9–10.  At level 0, 
human drivers perform all driving tasks. Id.  At level 1, a vehicle’s automated system 
sometimes assists the human driver with some driving tasks. Id.  At level 2, a vehicle’s 
automated system can conduct some driving tasks, while the human driver monitors the 
environment and performs the remaining tasks. Id.  At level 3, an automated system may 
sometimes conduct parts of the driving task while also monitoring the driving environment, 
but the human driver must be ready to take back control when requested by the system. Id.  
At level 4, an automated system can conduct the driving task and monitor the driving 
environment, and the human need not take back control, but automation can operate only in 
certain conditions. Id.  Finally, at level 5, the automated system can perform all driving 
tasks, under the same conditions as a human driver. Id. 
 94. Id. at 10. 
 95. See infra Part II.C. 
 96. See Emily Dobson, Note, Transportation Network Companies:  How Should South 
Carolina Adjust Its Regulatory Framework?, 66 S.C. L. REV. 701, 703 (2015) (examining 
the insurance coverage Uber provides to consider effective regulatory approaches for TNCs). 
 97. See id. 
 98. See id. 
 99. See generally Deborah F. Buckman, Annotation, Liability and Regulation of Ride-
Sharing Services Using Social Media, 6 A.L.R.7th Art. 1 (2015). 
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complexity surrounding TNCs involves questions of insurance coverage100 
and worker classification.101  Although TNC regulation involves many 
concerns, most germane to this Note is insurance coverage.102 
The insurance industry supports establishing rules for TNCs to provide 
clarity regarding what insurance coverage is provided, when it is provided 
(and by whom) as well as disclosures for drivers and passengers.103  Over 
forty states have implemented legislation for TNCs.104  California and 
Colorado have adopted two of the most detailed statutes to address 
TNCs.105  California’s legislature has established specific liability coverage 
and disclosure requirements.106  The statute provides different coverage 
requirements based on two distinct time periods:  (1) when drivers have 
accepted ride requests until the rides are complete and (2) when drivers are 
logged into the application but are in between rides and have not received 
ride requests.107  TNCs are also required to disclose in writing to drivers the 
insurance coverage that the company will provide and to “advise a 
participating driver . . . that the driver’s personal automobile insurance 
policy will not provide coverage because the driver uses a vehicle in 
connection with a transportation network company’s online-enabled 
application or platform.”108  Additionally, instead of fitting TNCs under 
preexisting classifications, California’s legislature created a new category 
of commercial carriers to address concerns distinctive to TNCs.109  
Similarly, Colorado’s statute establishes specific time periods for TNC 
services,110 and it distinguishes between common carriers and TNCs by 
exempting the latter from requirements that accompany common 
carriers.111 
Additionally, TNC regulation often occurs at the municipal level.  Some 
cities have embraced the operation of TNCs while still demanding that they 
 
 100. See, e.g., Dobson, supra note 96. 
 101. See, e.g., Buckman, supra note 99; Tracey Lien, Lyft Settles Worker 
Misclassification Lawsuit for $12.25 Million, L.A. TIMES (Jan. 27, 2016, 7:18 PM), 
http://www.latimes.com/business/technology/la-fi-tn-lyft-settlement-20160126-story.html 
[https://perma.cc/E66C-Q9NL]. 
 102. The classification of drivers as either employees or independent contractors is an 
important concern for TNC liability.  This question is critical in determining whether TNCs 
are liable in tort for drivers’ conduct. See Buckman, supra note 99.  However, it is outside 
this Note’s scope because presumably self-driving vehicles will ultimately render the driver 
classification question insignificant. 
 103. See Transportation Network Companies, PROP. CASUALTY INSURERS ASS’N AM., 
http://www.pciaa.net/industry-issues/transportation-network-companies (last visited Feb. 16, 
2017) [https://perma.cc/4RBX-CAUK]. 
 104. See id. 
 105. See Dobson, supra note 96, at 710 (“Although most states have not enacted as 
detailed of statutes for TNC insurance requirements as Colorado and California have, the 
insurance concerns are still present.”). 
 106. See id. 
 107. See id. at 708; CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 5434 (West 2015). 
 108. CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 5432(a). 
 109. See id. § 5440(a). 
 110. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 40-10.1-604(3) (2016). 
 111. See id. § 40-10.1-603. 
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meet certain levels of regulation.112  For example, Baton Rouge, Louisiana, 
allows “TNCs to operate, free of the licensing, inspections and rate-setting 
regulations of the Taxicab Control Board” and does not require specific 
insurance coverage.113  The city nonetheless requires that drivers pass 
background checks and that vehicles undergo inspections.114  Alternatively, 
some cities, like Auburn, Alabama, have imposed burdensome 
ordinances.115  The harsh requirements forced Uber to end its operations in 
the area because of practical and economic unfeasibility.116  Finally, some 
cities have taken a middling regulatory approach, like Chicago, Illinois, 
which requires drivers to obtain chauffeurs’ licenses, pass background 
checks, and undergo vehicle inspections.117 
Although legislators and regulators have begun to confront difficult 
questions posed by emerging technologies, law often lags behind new 
technology, and self-driving vehicles fit into that narrative.118  
Technological advances will ultimately produce vehicles that require no 
human intervention,119 and questions of liability among the existing 
disparate framework will become increasingly complex:  Who—or what—
should be held responsible for mistakes on the road?120  Accordingly, Part 
II identifies competing automobile accident tort liability and insurance 
regimes to understand the challenges in adapting them to new technological 
and societal changes in transportation methods. 
II.  THE SCENIC ROUTE:  A LANDSCAPE OF LIABILITY THEORIES, 
VEHICLE STATUTES, AND INSURANCE REGIMES 
Existing laws are likely adequate to handle accidents involving the 
limited autopilot features already found in some vehicles.121  Normally, an 
individual sitting in the driver’s seat has a duty to use reasonable care to 
 
 112. See Dobson, supra note 96, at 711. 
 113. Lehmann, supra note 66, at 9. 
 114. See id. 
 115. See Dobson, supra note 96, at 711.  The city mandated that TNCs be held to the 
same requirements as taxi companies, including the same commercial insurance, city 
licensing fees, signage, and background check requirements. Id. 
 116. See id. 
 117. See id. 
 118. See Alex Davies, Self-Driving Cars Are Legal, but Real Rules Would Be Nice, 
WIRED (May 15, 2015, 7:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/2015/05/self-driving-cars-legal-
real-rules-nice/ (explaining the difficulties of regulating self-driving vehicles) 
[https://perma.cc/6N6N-9LPQ]; Markoff, supra note 24 (quoting counsel for the California 
Department of Motor Vehicles who states, “The technology is ahead of the law in many 
areas . . . .  If you look at the vehicle code, there are dozens of laws pertaining to the driver 
of a vehicle, and they all presume to have a human being operating the vehicle.”). 
 119. See Mitchell, supra note 37; see also Levine, supra note 38. 
 120. See, e.g., Alexis C. Madrigal, If a Self-Driving Car Gets in an Accident, Who—or 
What—Is Liable?, ATLANTIC (Aug. 13, 2014), http://www.theatlantic.com/ 
technology/archive/2014/08/if-a-self-driving-car-gets-in-an-accident-who-is-legally-liable/ 
375569/ [https://perma.cc/8ZBY-XTRU]. 
 121. See generally Bryant Walker Smith, Automated Vehicles Are Probably Legal in the 
United States, 1 TEX. A&M L. REV. 411 (2014) (providing a comprehensive analysis of 
whether self-driving vehicles can be legally used and sold in the United States). 
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avoid accidents, but questions arise about how such a duty may be imposed 
on a “driver” unable to intervene in the vehicle’s operation.122  Moreover, 
traffic laws assume that automobiles have “drivers,” “owners,” and 
“operators.”123  However, the transformative change in the automobile 
industry—from limited autopilot to complete automation—may blur the 
lines between these statutory terms and make them obsolete. 
Automobile accident litigation accounts for two-thirds of all claims, 
three-quarters of all lawyers’ fees, and three-quarters of all payouts in the 
personal injury liability system.124  Within this system, different regimes 
result in a wide variation of how the law treats vehicle owners, operators, 
and insurance policyholders when accidents occur.  These liability 
differences are key to understanding how the materialization of self-driving 
vehicles and TNCs present new challenges to traditional conceptions of tort 
liability.  Part II first explains the suitability of tort law for analyzing the 
issues presented and applicable theories of recovery.  It then identifies 
competing tort and insurance rules for two critically important parties when 
crashes occur:  vehicle owners and drivers. 
A.  Why Tort Law? 
When an automobile accident occurs, both tort law and criminal law play 
important roles.125  As vehicular crashes are one of the most pervasive 
causes of injury that society encounters, 
the law devotes substantial attention to preventing that bloodshed, 
allocating losses, and punishing dangerous drivers. . . .  Both [tort and 
criminal law] provide a mechanism for sanctioning dangerous drivers and 
deterring future crashes.  Both can apply to the same event—any given 
crash is potentially criminal, tortious, both, or neither.  However, tort and 
criminal law impose different sanctions according to different 
standards.126 
Scholars have identified several explanations for why understanding 
vehicular crashes as tort-like is useful.127  First, automobiles are 
fundamentally hazardous, while simultaneously invaluable.128  Thus, “[t]o 
the extent that traffic crashes are seen as inevitable costs of a necessary 
activity, tort’s regime of loss allocation is more appropriate than criminal 
 
 122. See supra note 38 and accompanying text. 
 123. See infra Part II.C. 
 124. THOMAS F. BURKE, LAWYERS, LAWSUITS, AND LEGAL RIGHTS:  THE BATTLE OVER 
LITIGATION IN AMERICAN SOCIETY 103 (2002). 
 125. See generally Noah M. Kazis, Comment, Tort Concepts in Traffic Crimes, 125 YALE 
L.J. 1131 (2016) (identifying how the state has blurred tort and criminal law in the traffic-
crime context). 
 126. Id.  Despite clear distinctions between tort and criminal law generally, in the 
vehicular accident context “the line between tort and criminal law is blurring, as criminal 
law takes on significant features of tort doctrine.” Id. at 1132. 
 127. See id. at 1146. 
 128. See id. (citing GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COST OF ACCIDENTS:  A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC 
ANALYSIS 18–20 (1970)). 
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law’s prohibitions.”129  Second, crashes often result from close calls 
involving simple bad luck.130  As a result, criminal law’s conceptual focus 
on moral culpability is not always appropriate when differences of a few 
inches or seconds cause an accident.131  For these reasons, this Note 
discusses automobile accidents in the tort law context and tort law’s 
application to the emergence of self-driving technology and to limited 
vehicle ownership. 
1.  Fundamental Tort Principles 
In automobile accident litigation, the two most common theories of 
liability raised by plaintiffs are negligence and strict liability.132  Strict 
liability in tort applies fault to the party that caused injury, regardless of 
actual fault.133  Generally, strict liability is asserted in claims that implicate 
products liability134 or abnormally dangerous activities.135  However, many 
courts have moved away from applying absolute strict liability, instead 
applying a reasonableness consideration that begins to merge with the 
negligence standard.136 
Most of tort law is governed by negligence,137 which considers the 
reasonableness of a defendant’s actions measured in terms of standards of 
care.138  To prevail on a negligence claim, a plaintiff must show a 
defendant’s failure to exercise the care that a reasonably prudent person 
would exercise in like circumstances, expressed in four elements:  duty, 
breach, causation, and damages.139  However, doctrines fitting within 
negligence sometimes allow plaintiffs to prevail without explicitly proving 
 
 129. Id. 
 130. See id. (citing Tom Baker, Liability Insurance, Moral Luck, and Auto Accidents, 
9 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 165, 167–70 (2008)). 
 131. See id. (citing Stephen J. Schulhofer, Harm and Punishment:  A Critique of 
Emphasis on the Results of Conduct in the Criminal Law, 122 U. PA. L. REV. 1497, 1513 
n.64 (1974)). 
 132. See, e.g., Marchant & Lindor, supra note 10, at 1323. 
 133. See id. 
 134. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:  PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 1 (AM. LAW INST. 
1988).  For example, manufacturers of defective tools are liable to injured individuals who 
show that they were using the product as intended, even if manufacturers were not negligent 
in making the tools. See Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., 377 P.2d 897, 901 (Cal. 1963) 
(“To establish the manufacturer’s liability it was sufficient that plaintiff proved that he was 
injured while using the [power tool as] it was intended to be used as a result of a defect in 
design and manufacture of which plaintiff was not aware that made [it] unsafe for its 
intended use.”). 
 135. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:  LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL 
HARM ch. 4, scope note (AM. LAW INST. 2005). 
 136. See Marchant & Lindor, supra note 10, at 1323. 
 137. See Kenneth W. Simons, The Crime/Tort Distinction:  Legal Doctrine and 
Normative Perspectives, 17 WIDENER L.J. 719, 722 (2008). 
 138. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS:  LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL 
HARM § 7. 
 139. See Negligence, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
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each element.140  Moreover, plaintiffs can attempt to recover not only from 
individuals but also from manufacturers, franchisors, trade associations, or 
entire industries.141  Thus, broader theories of recovery may be applicable 
to seek redress against alleged tortfeasors when tortious conduct includes an 
array of participants.142 
2.  Enterprise Liability Theory 
Under enterprise liability theory, individual entities can be held jointly 
liable for conduct resulting from participation in a shared enterprise.143  In 
other words, separate organizations can be held liable for practices or 
actions in which they shared.144  Thus, like other theories in which tortious 
conduct can be inferred, enterprise liability is based on the assertion that 
courts may determine liability even when plaintiffs are unable to show that 
a particular defendant is at fault.145 
Enterprise liability theorizes that activities that are foreseeable yet 
potentially hazardous should bear the costs they engender.146  Guido 
Calabresi—an advocate of the law and economics movement—and other 
proponents envisioned enterprise liability as extending beyond traditional 
negligence to include the idea of no-fault negligence.147  Accordingly, 
enterprise liability would entail “the notion that losses should be borne by 
the doer[s], the enterprise, rather than distributed on the basis of fault” that 
results from individual negligence.148  Thus, the actual costs of activities 
are the injuries that occur as a result, regardless of blame.149 
Because the goals of enterprise liability are victim compensation and loss 
spreading, Calabresi connected loss distribution to a strict allocation of 
resources theory.150  He argued that framing “the problem of accident law 
in terms of activities rather than in terms of careless conduct [is] the first 
step toward a rational system of resource allocation.”151  Further, “a system 
of nonfault enterprise liability . . . that assesses the costs of accidents to 
 
 140. Under a theory of res ipsa loquitur, for example, “the mere fact of an accident’s 
occurrence raises an inference of negligence that establishes a prima facie case.” Res Ipsa 
Loquitur, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
 141. See Victoria C. Dawson, Who Is Responsible When You Shop Until You Drop?:  An 
Impact on the Use of the Aggressive Marketing Schemes of “Black Friday” Through 
Enterprise Liability Concepts, 50 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 747, 751–52 (2010). 
 142. See id. 
 143. See, e.g., Naomi Sheiner, Comment, DES and a Proposed Theory of Enterprise 
Liability, 46 FORDHAM L. REV. 963, 974 (1978) (proposing enterprise liability theory as a 
solution to the causation problems posed in Diethylstilbestrol (DES) litigation). 
 144. See id. 
 145. See id. 
 146. See Dawson, supra note 141, at 785 (citing Guido Calabresi, The Decision for 
Accidents:  An Approach to Nonfault Allocation of Cost, 78 HARV. L. REV. 713, 716 (1965)). 
 147. See id. at 766. 
 148. Guido Calabresi, Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution and the Law of Torts, 70 YALE 
L.J. 499, 500 (1961). 
 149. See id. at 505. 
 150. See Dawson, supra note 141, at 766. 
 151. Id. at 767 (quoting Calabresi, supra note 146, at 717). 
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activities according to their involvement in accidents”152 would be the 
appropriate way to achieve “a system of accident liability based on accident 
‘involvement’ instead of fault.”153  Thus, enterprise liability could aid 
society in determining to what extent it seeks to deter accidents.154 
In line with these principles, early enterprise liability scholars focused on 
proposals for automobile compensation plans.155  Inspired by the enactment 
of workers’ compensation legislation, scholars envisioned related solutions 
for automobile accidents.156  However, resistance from special interests—
insurance companies and trial lawyers—forced enterprise liability scholars 
to turn to strict products liability.157  Therefore, strict products liability and 
no-fault compensation plans are aspects of broader enterprise liability 
theory.158 
According to enterprise liability theory, personal injury law’s goal should 
be to create “a more comprehensive and more adequate means of protection 
for all victims of personal injuries . . . without placing too heavy a burden 
on enterprise or any other segment of the social group.”159  Today, although 
individual negligence still dominates tort law, enterprise-liability-like 
remedies have become incorporated legislatively and administratively into 
workers’ compensation plans, health care policies, and no-fault automobile 
insurance schemes.160 
After an automobile crash, several parties are potentially liable in a 
victim’s tort lawsuit.  A vehicle’s owner and driver are both central to the 
issue of tort liability.161 
 
 152. Calabresi, supra note 146, at 719. 
 153. Id. at 743. 
 154. See Dawson, supra note 141, at 767 (citing Calabresi, supra note 146, at 742–43). 
 155. See Virginia E. Nolan & Edmund Ursin, Enterprise Liability Reexamined, 75 OR. L. 
REV. 467, 471 (1996) (discussing the focus of early enterprise liability theorists).  The 
authors argued that enterprise liability theory, properly understood, opens up new 
possibilities for personal injury law reform. See id. at 469. 
 156. See id. at 471. 
 157. See id. 
 158. See id. 
 159. See id. (quoting Leon Green, The Individual’s Protection Under Negligence Law:  
Risk Sharing, 47 NW. U. L. REV. 751, 775 (1953)). 
 160. See Dawson, supra note 141, at 784. 
 161. There exist many other parties with potential tort liability.  As a vehicle’s 
manufacturer may be entirely responsible for a self-driving vehicle’s functionality, products 
liability is a relevant body of tort law.  A products liability claim grounded in defective 
design may be available against the manufacturer of a self-driving vehicle. See, e.g., Bose, 
supra note 26; Kyle Colonna, Note, Autonomous Cars and Tort Liability, 4 CASE W. RES. 
J.L. TECH. & INTERNET 81 (2012).  A defectively designed product is “one which, at the time 
it leaves the seller’s hands, is in a condition not reasonably contemplated by the ultimate 
consumer and is unreasonably dangerous for its intended use; that is one whose utility does 
not outweigh the danger inherent in its introduction into the stream of commerce.” Voss v. 
Black & Decker Mfg. Co., 450 N.E.2d 204, 207 (N.Y. 1983) (quoting Robinson v. Reed-
Prentice Div. of Package Mach. Co., 403 N.E.2d 440, 443 (N.Y. 1980)).  Accordingly, a 
manufacturer may be held strictly liable for injuries that result from a defectively designed 
product. See, e.g., Hoover v. New Holland N. Am., 11 N.E.3d 693, 701 (N.Y. 2014) 
(“Where a plaintiff is injured as a result of a defectively designed product, the product 
manufacturer or others in the chain of distribution may be held strictly liable for those 
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B.  Vehicle Ownership and Vicarious Liability 
Vehicle owners may be held liable in tort, but the definition of what 
constitutes an owner for purposes of liability and the reach of that liability 
vary by state.  Moreover, vehicle ownership liability implicates federal law 
and insurance requirements.  These variations are significant when 
considering the potential ability of TNCs to deploy fleets of self-driving 
vehicles; these changes may result in concentrated ownership by 
commercial entities while diminishing ownership among private 
individuals. 
Some states hold vehicle owners vicariously liable for a driver’s 
negligence.  For example, New York imposes liability against the vehicle’s 
owner for the negligence of the vehicle’s permissive users.162  Further, the 
applicable statutory definition of “owner” includes “any lessee or bailee of 
a motor vehicle or vessel having the exclusive use thereof, under a lease or 
otherwise, for a period greater than thirty days.”163  At common law, a 
vehicle’s owner was not liable for a permissive user’s negligent 
operation.164  Thus, New York’s statute created a cause of action where 
none previously existed,165 in the nature of vicarious liability.166  The 
statute’s purpose is to ensure access by injured victims to “a financially 
responsible insured person against whom to recover for injuries”167 and to 
“remove the hardship which the common-law rule visited upon innocent 
persons by preventing ‘an owner from escaping liability by saying that his 
car was being used without authority, or not in his business.’”168 
In addition to holding owners vicariously liable for permissible drivers’ 
negligence, the New York statute requires that owners acquire adequate 
insurance coverage.169  The connection between owners’ vicarious liability 
and their accompanying obligation to maintain adequate insurance suggests 
a legislative intent to ensure that owners subject to New York law act 
responsibly regarding their vehicles.170  New York is not alone in imposing 
unlimited vicarious liability on vehicle owners for driver negligence.  
 
injuries.” (citations omitted)).  Nonetheless, a thorough discussion of products liability is 
beyond this Note’s scope. 
 162. See N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 388 (McKinney 2011).  The statute provides: 
Every owner of a vehicle used or operated in this state shall be liable and 
responsible for death or injuries to person or property resulting from negligence in 
the use or operation of such vehicle, in the business of such owner or otherwise, by 
any person using or operating the same with the permission, express or implied, of 
such owner. 
Id. 
 163. Id. § 128; see also Hassan v. Montuori, 786 N.E.2d 25, 27 (N.Y. 2003). 
 164. See Morris v. Snappy Car Rental, Inc., 637 N.E.2d 253, 254 (N.Y. 1994). 
 165. See id. at 255. 
 166. See Gochee v. Wagner, 178 N.E. 553, 554 (N.Y. 1931). 
 167. Plath v. Justus, 268 N.E.2d 117, 119 (N.Y. 1971). 
 168. Mills v. Gabriel, 18 N.Y.S.2d 78, 80 (App. Div. 1940) (quoting Plaumbo v. Ryan, 
210 N.Y.S. 225 (App. Div. 1925)). 
 169. See N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 388(4) (McKinney 2011). 
 170. See Fried v. Seippel, 599 N.E.2d 651, 655 (N.Y. 1992). 
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Similar vicarious liability statutes have been enacted in Maine and Rhode 
Island.171 
There exists an important constraint on unlimited vicarious liability 
statutes.  New York’s statute is preempted by federal law through the 
Graves Amendment172 to the Safe, Accountable, Flexible, Efficient 
Transportation Equity Act173 (SAFETEA).  Due to Congress’s Commerce 
Clause power,174 the Graves Amendment prevents states from holding 
rental and leasing companies vicariously liable for injuries resulting from a 
vehicle’s negligent operation.175  Accordingly, the Graves Amendment 
protects New York lessors and rental companies from vicarious liability.176  
The Graves Amendment also preempts other states’ laws.177  For example, 
the Eleventh Circuit’s affirmation of the Graves Amendment’s 
constitutionality may leave individuals without recourse under Florida law 
if injured by the driver of a rented vehicle.178 
Florida’s vehicle ownership law is based on a form of vicarious liability 
labeled the “dangerous instrumentality doctrine.”179  Historically, courts 
applied this doctrine in the master-servant context where a master entrusted 
a servant with an instrument that was highly dangerous or could be used in 
a high-risk manner.180  In these circumstances, the master could be held 
liable for injuries resulting from the servant using the instrument.181  Most 
states have held that automobiles are not dangerous instruments under this 
common law theory of vicarious liability; Florida is an exception.182 
First applied to automobiles in 1920, Florida’s dangerous instrumentality 
doctrine imposes strict vicarious liability upon a vehicle’s owner who 
voluntarily entrusts that vehicle to an individual whose negligent operation 
 
 171. See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 29-A, § 1652(1) (2016); 31 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 31-34-
4(a) (2016); Susan Lorde Martin, Commerce Clause Jurisprudence and the Graves 
Amendment:  Implications for the Vicarious Liability of Car Leasing Companies, 18 U. FLA. 
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 153, 157 (2007) (providing an overview of state vicarious liability law to 
understand the constitutional implications of the Graves Amendment). 
 172. 49 U.S.C. § 30106 (2012). 
 173. See Green v. Toyota Motor CreditCorp, 605 F. Supp. 2d 430, 433–34 (E.D.N.Y. 
2009). 
 174. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. (providing Congress’s power [t]o regulate 
Commerce . . . among the several States.”). 
 175. See Green, 605 F. Supp. 2d at 433–34. 
 176. See, e.g., Graham v. Dunkley, 852 N.Y.S.2d 169 (App. Div. 2008). 
 177. See Brent Steinberg, Note, The Graves Amendment:  Putting to Death Florida’s 
Strict Vicarious Liability Law, 62 FLA. L. REV. 795, 796–97 (2010) (analyzing the effects of 
the Graves Amendment on Florida law). 
 178. See id. at 796 (citing Garcia v. Vanguard Car Rental USA, Inc., 540 F.3d 1242, 1253 
(11th Cir. 2008)). 
 179. See generally Sarah E. Williams, Comment, Florida’s Dangerous Instrumentality 
Doctrine, 25 STETSON L. REV. 177 (1995) (describing vicarious liability and the development 
of Florida’s dangerous instrumentality doctrine, and suggesting a judicial framework for 
automobile accident cases under the doctrine). 
 180. See id. at 179. 
 181. See id. at 179–80. 
 182. See id. at 180. 
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causes damage.183  Seventy years after its adoption, the Supreme Court of 
Florida reaffirmed the doctrine’s rationale: 
The dangerous instrumentality doctrine seeks to provide greater financial 
responsibility to pay for the carnage on our roads.  It is premised upon the 
theory that the one who originates the danger by entrusting the automobile 
to another is in the best position to make certain that there will be 
adequate resources with which to pay the damages caused by its negligent 
operation.  If Florida’s traffic problems were sufficient to prompt its 
adoption in 1920, there is all the more reason for its application to today’s 
high-speed travel upon crowded highways.  The dangerous 
instrumentality doctrine is unique to Florida and has been applied with 
very few exceptions.184 
Using this theory, Florida courts impute negligence from the individual 
who actually committed a negligent act (the driver) to a third party with no 
role in the act.185  Thus, while Florida’s common law application of the 
doctrine to motor vehicles may be unique, it is similar to New York’s 
statute because both hold individuals responsible who are not actually at 
fault, through strict and vicarious liability.  However, Florida’s strict 
vicarious liability differs from New York’s because it is not unlimited.186  
Instead, Florida relieves owners and lessors of liability if they maintain 
specified insurance minimums through a “financial responsibility” 
statute.187  Several other states have similar financial responsibility schemes 
to limit vicarious liability of owners for driver negligence.188  As in New 
York, vehicle ownership liability in Florida and states with similar statutory 
schemes becomes relevant in the TNC context because ownership 
definitions and the extent of ownership liability are important 
considerations in concentrated ownership structures dominated by 
commercial entities. 
Alternatively, some states specifically eliminate vicarious liability for 
owners.189  Iowa’s statute declares that, for leased vehicles, a vehicle’s 
lessee is the owner for liability purposes, not the person to whom title has 
been issued.190  Similarly, Utah’s statute provides that a vehicle’s “lessee in 
possession” is its owner.191  Thus, in these states an individual who has 
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 185. See Aurbach, 753 So. 2d at 62–63. 
 186. See Steinberg, supra note 177, at 804. 
 187. Martin, supra note 171, at 158–59. 
 188. See id. 
 189. See id. at 160. 
 190. See id.; IOWA CODE § 321.493 (2017) (“[I]f the vehicle is leased, ‘owner’ means the 
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 191. UTAH CODE ANN. § 41-12a-103(8)(b) (West 2016); Martin, supra note 171, at 160. 
1886 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 85 
leased a vehicle is its owner, and therefore the leasing company, dealership, 
or rental company cannot face vicarious liability.192 
Other states differentiate between long- and short-term lessors for 
liability purposes.193  Nevada provides vicarious liability only for short-
term lessees, provided that the requisite insurance has not been obtained.194  
Nevada defines a short-term lessor as one who has leased a vehicle for 
thirty-one days or less.195 
In sum, the reach of vehicle ownership liability varies by state, as does 
the definition of what constitutes a vehicle’s owner for liability purposes.  
Moreover, questions of insurance coverage are crucial in determining the 
liability of vehicle owners.  Finally, federal law critically preempts 
vicarious liability in some circumstances.  These details are necessary 
considerations in determining how to allocate liability as TNCs potentially 
use self-driving vehicles to reduce individual ownership. 
C.  Drivers and Operators 
There is no state statutory scheme that expressly requires a vehicle to 
have a human driver.196  Nonetheless, state vehicle codes impose 
obligations on vehicle drivers and, correspondingly, any person (or 
instrument) who drives, operates, or has “actual physical control” of a 
vehicle.197  Generally, state statutes broadly define these operative terms. 
New York’s statute is representative of an expansive definition of 
“driver,” encompassing every “person who operates or drives or is in actual 
physical control of a vehicle.”198  Accordingly, any individual sitting at the 
steering wheel falls under the definition of “driver” whether or not the 
individual is exercising control.  Thus, usage of the terms “drives,” 
“operates,” or “is in actual physical control of,” includes a wide range of 
possible circumstances.199  For example, California courts have deemed 
individuals to be “drivers” when (1) exiting the vehicle from the front left 
seat,200 (2) failing to engage the parking brake before exiting the vehicle,201 
 
 192. Before enactment of the Graves Amendment, New York leasing companies paid 
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 193. See Martin, supra note 171, at 160. 
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(3) towing an occupied vehicle,202 and (4) manually pushing an inoperable 
vehicle.203  These wide-ranging circumstances suggest that an individual in 
“actual physical control of” a vehicle can be the “driver” even if one does 
not “drive” it.204  Conversely, an individual who drives a vehicle can be a 
“driver” even if she is not in “actual physical control.”205 
Some states, like California, differentiate in case law between driving—
which requires motion—and operating—which does not.206  Other states 
clearly define the terms differently by statute.  In Wisconsin, the legislature 
defines “operate” and “drive” separately in the drunk-driving context.207  
Whereas “drive” is defined as “the exercise of physical control over the 
speed and direction of a motor vehicle while it is in motion,” the word 
“operate” means “the physical manipulation or activation of any of the 
controls of a motor vehicle necessary to put it in motion.”208  Alternatively, 
Illinois does not statutorily distinguish between driving, operating, or being 
in physical control of a vehicle.209 
Like “driver,” the word “operator” in the automobile context is broadly 
defined by courts and legislatures, with the definitions varying by 
jurisdiction.210  Courts have broadly construed the term when applying 
it to vehicle and traffic laws.211  Some courts have recognized that a 
person may operate a vehicle without driving it.212  The Supreme Court 
of Massachusetts held that “[a] person operates a motor 
vehicle . . . when . . . he intentionally does any act or makes use of any 
mechanical or electrical agency which alone or in sequence will set in 
motion the motive power of that vehicle.”213  Likewise, New York courts 
have explicitly held that “operator” is broader than “driver.”214  Finally, 
“actual physical control” can be even broader than operation.215  The 
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Supreme Court of Montana was the first state to hold that an individual has 
actual physical control of a vehicle if she “‘has existing or present bodily 
restraint, directing influence, domination or regulation, of’ it.”216 
The three descriptors—“drives,” “operates,” or “is in actual physical 
control of”—capture a broad array of possible circumstances that 
significantly varies by jurisdiction.217  Therefore, depending on the 
situation and jurisdiction, individuals sitting in the driver’s seats of self-
driving vehicles may be considered drivers even if they are not exercising 
any control.  This has the potential to create unfair results.  Thus, these 
nuanced discrepancies are important in defining the tort obligations of 
vehicle drivers or operators218 and for determining how they should apply 
to operators of self-driving vehicles to ensure that inequitable outcomes are 
avoided. 
D.  Duties of Care:  Fault-Based Liability 
A driver’s actions may constitute civil negligence without reaching the 
higher threshold of criminal conduct.219  While a minority of states follow a 
no-fault system for insurance purposes,220 most states rely on a 
determination of fault when apportioning liability.221  Thus, it is necessary 
to identify the relevant duty that a vehicle’s driver owes and the factors to 
consider in determining whether that duty has been breached.222 
In most jurisdictions, there is an obligation of prudence required of 
drivers in lawsuits alleging driver negligence.223  Some states’ codes also 
incorporate the concept of “due care.”224  By statute, New York requires 
drivers to “exercise due care to avoid colliding with any bicyclist, 
pedestrian, or domestic animal upon any roadway.”225  Moreover, New 
York drivers have common law duties concerning the safe operation of their 
vehicles.226  Specifically, 
drivers are under a duty:  (1) to maintain a reasonably safe rate of speed; 
(2) to have their automobiles under reasonable control; (3) to keep a 
proper lookout, under the circumstances then existing, to see and be aware 
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of what was in their view; and (4) to use reasonable care to avoid an 
accident.227 
This duty includes a driver’s responsibility to account for dangers from 
weather, road, traffic, and other conditions.228  To this end, a driver is 
“chargeable with knowledge of what a prudent and vigilant operator would 
have seen, and is negligent if he fails to discover a vehicle which, or a 
traveler whom, he could have discovered in time to avoid the injury in the 
exercise of reasonable care.”229 
References in statutes and court holdings to reasonableness, prudence, 
practicability, and due care show that while the law accepts a certain level 
of risk, it does not specify how to determine that level.230  Thus, the 
statutory language and case law imply a relative approach and the need for 
context rather than certainty.231  Regardless, this approach requires a fault 
determination based on driver conduct, which is understandably relevant 
when considering liability solutions for vehicles with no drivers.  While 
some states impose a fault-based regime, others use a system that limits the 
ability of victims to sue alleged negligent drivers. 
E.  No-Fault Insurance 
In the event of an accident, drivers can be liable under traditional 
negligence232 or no-fault liability.233  Of course, tort law underpins 
automobile usage in all jurisdictions.234  However, vehicle owners are 
generally required to have third-party liability insurance or to certify that 
they have the means to self-insure.235  As a result, “with insurance 
companies and their adjusters being well aware of the applicable ‘rules of 
the road’ (relevant motor vehicle tort case law and legislation) in assessing 
fault and whether there was a breach of duty and causation which resulted 
in damages,” the majority of claims never go to court.236 
In a no-fault regime, insurance policyholders are limited in their right to 
sue negligent tortfeasors.237  Drivers may not use the court system unless 
their injuries reach a specified level.238  If injuries are below the threshold, 
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victims are compensated by their insurer, rather than the alleged tortfeasor’s 
insurer.239 
Twelve states and the District of Columbia use a no-fault system.240  No 
state has a pure no-fault regime.241  Instead, no-fault states have adopted 
modified systems where the right to sue for damages is allowed only after 
satisfying statutorily defined monetary, verbal—or a combination of the 
two—thresholds.242  New York, Florida, Michigan, New Jersey, and 
Pennsylvania have verbal thresholds, which use plain language to define 
precise injuries, or levels of “serious injury,” that must be met to commence 
a lawsuit.243  The definition of serious injury is sometimes established by 
statute,244 but it can also be a question of fact that depends on an injury’s 
effect on the victim.245  Alternatively, Kansas, Kentucky, Massachusetts, 
Minnesota, North Dakota, Hawaii, and Utah use monetary thresholds, 
where a specific dollar amount of medical expenses must be accrued before 
a lawsuit may be filed.246 
In addition to threshold-related variations among no-fault regimes, other 
states employ further modifications.  Nine states offer “add-on” no-fault 
benefits, where no-fault coverage supplements the conventional tort liability 
system and its accompanying insurance coverage.247  Another distinction is 
that some states have mandatory add-on benefits, while in other states they 
are optional.248  Finally, Kentucky, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania use a 
hybrid no-fault system that creates two classes of policyholders by retaining 
parts of both pure no-fault and traditional fault-based schemes.249  This 
“choice” system allows drivers to choose between limited tort insurance, 
which is less expensive and restricts the right to recover, and full insurance, 
which allows retention of full rights to recover against third parties but 
costs more.250 
In sum, there is wide variation among states concerning potential 
vicarious liability of vehicle owners, definitions for drivers and operators, 
notions of the duty of care, and how automobile insurance fits into accident 
liability.  These differences matter in determining the suitability of certain 
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liability aspects for transportation with reduced driver input and limited 
ownership. 
III.  THE PROPOSAL:  APPLYING RECOGNIZED TORT PRINCIPLES 
TO FUTURE TRANSPORTATION 
In applying the liability regimes discussed in Part II to the technological 
development identified in Part I, this Note first recognizes previous efforts 
to address these complexities.  Accordingly, Part III identifies one scholar’s 
analysis regarding the relationship between tort law and emerging 
technology before shifting to a practical application to self-driving vehicles.  
Part III then proposes specific suggestions that apply elements of enterprise 
liability to address the changing nature of vehicle ownership and driver 
control created by the simultaneous rise of ride-sharing services and self-
driving vehicles. 
A.  Tort Law and Innovation 
Tort law addresses duties of care that individuals and organizations owe.  
However, tort law does more than simply attribute blame; it fundamentally 
entails cost spreading.251  Thus, the need to identify well-financed 
defendants with the ability to relieve victims is an important policy 
consideration.252  Despite tort’s settled foundations, there is implicit 
uncertainty in how the law applies to emerging technologies.253 
This Note is not the first attempt to address legal issues for self-driving 
automobiles.254  To expand on the difficulties of these questions, Professor 
Kyle Graham has identified several recurring features that demonstrate the 
interplay between tort law and new technology.255  This Note implicates 
three of his observations. 
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First, while initial lawsuits relating to an innovation may not resemble 
later claims, law arising from early cases endures even as the technology’s 
risks evolve.256  The invention of the automobile is a prime example of this 
phenomenon.257  Early automobile-related lawsuits barely resemble modern 
automobile litigation.258  Rather, early automobile litigation usually 
“involved claims that the sight or sound of a motor carriage caused a horse 
to take fright, resulting in injury either to the horse’s rider, the occupants of 
a carriage or wagon the horse had been towing, or the horse itself.”259  
Turn-of-the-century courts understood that automobiles were unlikely to be 
a passing fad.260  Thus, theories of negligence per se, nuisance, and strict 
liability were rejected.261  However, these cases are significant because 
“they produced automobile-friendly rules with staying power.”262 
Second, until new technology matures and consumers broadly adopt it, 
risk profiles are difficult to predict accurately.263  Thus, courts naturally 
gravitate toward form-based analogies.264  For example, nineteenth century 
hot-air balloon operators were subject to a strict liability rule for ground 
damage.265  This rule was subsequently adopted for airplanes because both 
were subject to gravity.266  The harsh strict liability rule for airplanes 
persisted even as commercial aviation became safe and common.267  
Accordingly, simplistic early analogies may produce rules that might be too 
harsh and ultimately require reevaluation.268 
Finally, courts often believe that early adopters assume the risk of new 
technology.269  Again, the invention of the automobile demonstrates this 
“blaming the user” dynamic.270  During the early automobile period, courts 
often erroneously blamed speeding for accidents, even when they appeared 
to have been caused by obvious mechanical failure, a common occurrence 
at the time.271 
As a consequence of these patterns, self-driving vehicle litigation may 
evolve over time, with early claims resembling contemporary lawsuits 
alleging negligent vehicle usage: 
[C]laims likely will continue to ascribe fault to the users of autonomous 
vehicles, drawing distinctions between “proper” and “improper” use 
premised on the slowly accumulating body of knowledge on this topic.  
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Some of these claims may lack analogues in current torts practice.  For 
example, perhaps plaintiffs will attack decisions to utilize autonomous 
vehicles in specific areas where experience has shown that they present 
relatively significant dangers.272 
Courts should thus be mindful of the effect that early cases will have on 
subsequent decisions and legislation.  Additionally, courts must be careful 
not to create overly harsh rules or attempt to analogize the technology to 
existing practice, while also understanding the critical role of early 
adopters.  Professor Graham emphasizes the role of uncertainty in tort law’s 
application to emerging technologies.  In doing so, he builds upon 
scholarship anticipating how courts may perceive products liability issues 
arising from self-driving vehicle accidents and the potential change in 
liability from driver to manufacturer.273 
Numerous experts have discussed this shift, its consequences, and 
solutions, as well as other proposals to address legal questions relating to 
self-driving vehicles.274  However, this Note argues that these contributions 
are incomplete because they do not consider the potentially dominant role 
of TNCs and the changing nature of vehicle ownership.  Self-driving 
vehicle development is not occurring in isolation; rather, it is part of a 
broader revolution in transportation.  Accordingly, this Note takes into 
account that innovation is not a linear progression but involves multiple 
emerging technological and societal developments.  It further assumes 
eventual widespread deployment of fully autonomous self-driving vehicles 
to look beyond short-term solutions.  Current tort analogues are 
inappropriate for this future transportation paradigm.  Thus, this Note 
proposes a regime that considers liability issues for vehicle owners and 
operators with ubiquitous usage of self-driving vehicles and TNCs. 
B.  Resolution for the Future 
This Note provides a solution to the significant automobile accident 
liability questions raised by the combined emergence of TNCs and self-
driving vehicles.  As these developments reshape the nature of vehicle 
ownership and driver control, an effective proposal considers three 
interrelated concerns:  (1) optimal societal outcomes that account for the 
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costs and benefits of new technology and continued development, (2) 
careful application of prevailing liability regimes to new innovation, and (3) 
workable solutions for courts and legislatures. 
1.  Strict and Vicarious Liability 
The concurrent rise of ride-sharing and self-driving vehicles has created a 
unique convergence of traditional automobile manufacturers, leading 
technology corporations, and start-up TNCs.275  These enterprises 
simultaneously share some financial and data resources while also 
competing for market share and new technological breakthroughs.276  
Accordingly, financially responsible organizations that play a significant 
role in diminishing vehicle ownership and largely eliminating driver input 
should be held appropriately liable for tortious conduct.277  Thus, enterprise 
liability doctrine is applicable. 
Deterring undesirable behavior and compensating victims justify 
enterprise liability doctrine.278  Enterprise liability holds businesses strictly 
liable for risks associated with their routine operations; thus, it is associated 
with the doctrine of respondeat superior.279  Under respondeat superior, 
employers bear the risks of employees’ negligent conduct that may injure 
innocent victims within the scope of employment.280  TNCs, and other 
potential commercial operators of self-driving vehicles, engage in a 
business with known risks.  Therefore, these companies should bear the risk 
that their self-driven vehicles—whether leased, rented, or otherwise 
operated—may cause accidents.  Like employer-employee relationships, 
these risks are part of normal business operations.  Under vehicle codes that 
broadly define “operation,” self-driving vehicle operators should be held 
liable for their vehicles’ conduct acting within the scope of the vehicle’s 
role.281 
As enterprise liability is based on involvement in activities, rather than 
fault, it forms the theoretical basis for strict liability regimes predominantly 
implemented for products liability and inherently dangerous activities.282  
However, self-driving is theoretically safer than regular driving,283 which is 
already considered a normal, everyday activity.  Further, self-driving 
vehicles may be implicated in accidents even absent a manufacturing or 
design defect.  Nonetheless, strict liability is a useful approach for self-
driving vehicles because the “driver” is a computer system incapable of 
negligence under traditional common law and statutory formulations of due 
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care.284  Thus, it is logical to impute responsibility to a third party that 
played no role in the negligent act.285  Moreover, holding enterprises 
strictly and vicariously liable eliminates the need to reconcile contradictory 
and confusing statutes that attempt to define the obligations of individuals 
who operate or exert control over vehicles.286 
The strict, vicarious nature of enterprise liability aligns with vehicle 
ownership statutes that hold owners vicariously liable for permissive 
drivers’ negligence.287  The purpose of these statutes is to force financially 
responsible defendants to pay for innocent victims’ injuries;288 the 
underlying principle is that an individual who entrusts an automobile to 
another has adequate resources to pay damages.289  Accordingly, there is a 
robust policy-based rationale applicable to self-driving vehicles when deep-
pocketed TNCs dominate vehicle ownership, effectively functioning as 
ubiquitous leasing or rental companies.290 
A strict and vicarious liability regime rooted in enterprise liability 
principles is justified because businesses involved in deploying networks of 
self-driving vehicles—whether characterized as ride-sharing, automotive, or 
technology companies—are situated to spread their losses efficiently.291  
This can be achieved by adjusting prices to reflect all costs, including the 
liability costs incurred from accidents.292  By spreading losses, these 
businesses can adequately bear the burden of their operations.293  
Additionally, by adjusting rates, these companies can remain profitable, 
thus allowing them to continue to operate and innovate. 
2.  No-Fault Insurance 
Enterprise liability-like insurance regimes have been incorporated into 
workers’ compensation, health care policies, and no-fault automobile 
plans.294  In the employment context, workers’ compensation systems 
provide statutory remedies using a comprehensive scheme for 
compensating employees injured by employment-related accidents.295  The 
concept of workers’ compensation is premised on the recognition that 
discarding tort liability in the employment relationship is desirable.296  
Accordingly, workers’ compensation statutes function as social insurance 
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that shifts the burden of loss from the injured employee to the employer or 
industry.297 
As workers’ compensation has abolished fault-based liability for 
employers, no-fault automobile insurance should become the standard for 
self-driving vehicles.  In no-fault systems, policyholders are limited in their 
right to sue negligent tortfeasors and may only sue when injuries reach 
certain thresholds.298  Theoretically, self-driving vehicles will be 
demonstrably safer than traditional automobiles.299  As accidents become 
uncommon and relatively minor, a system that disposes of the need for 
fault-based tort inquires will be appropriate.  When severe accidents occur 
and injured parties are then able to meet lawsuit thresholds, it is more likely 
to implicate considerations outside of fault-based negligence like 
manufacturing or design defects.300  Products liability lawsuits will 
therefore remain available within the tort system. 
Self-driving vehicle insurance should be characterized using no-fault 
rules that reflect the difficulties for courts in determining fault.  Moreover, 
when a vehicle has no pedals, mirrors, or steering wheel, there is no need to 
determine the reasonableness, prudence, practicability, or due care in a 
driver’s conduct.301  Consequently, determining fault to apportion liability 
will become impractical.  Under a vicarious liability system with 
corresponding no-fault insurance, TNCs—presumptively the insurance 
policyholders—will be best suited to bear an insurance burden that shifts 
liability from drivers to vehicles.  When a system treats self-driving 
vehicles as insurable entities, “[t]he car becomes a separate insurable being 
that potentially provides a faster insurance payout to victims while 
protecting the owners from frivolous lawsuits.”302 
Importantly, lawmakers must address several considerations.  As TNCs 
continue to grow their business operations, regulations should clarify 
vehicle ownership definitions within the context of vicarious liability and 
how they apply to renters, lessees, and lessors.303  Likewise, legislatures 
need to refine what constitutes vehicle “operators” and the corresponding 
tort obligations for level 3–5 automated vehicles.304  Additionally, 
lawmakers need to address wide variation in states’ automobile insurance 
regimes, as they present potential barriers to transportation development.305 
This Note’s solution addresses the three interrelated concerns mentioned 
above.306  First, it allows stakeholders to continue to develop self-driving 
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technology and transportation networks in ways that benefit society while 
reducing costs arising from legal uncertainty.  Second, although analogies 
are inevitably drawn, concerns relating to harsh early rules and “blaming 
the user” dynamics are mitigated because fault determinations take on less 
importance, and the insurance system already exists in some jurisdictions.  
Third, the solution attempts to create a simplified system that can be applied 
by courts and legislatures. 
CONCLUSION 
As modes of transportation and commuting patterns fundamentally 
transform, so too will laws that determine complex liability questions.  The 
distant future is unavoidably difficult to predict and industry participants 
will continue to conceptualize new ideas for transportation.  Nonetheless, 
this Note envisions the future of self-driving transportation and limited 
vehicle ownership. 
New forms of transportation create uncertainty in applying tort law’s 
negligence standard to vehicle owners’ vicarious liability, vehicle 
operators’ duties of care, and corresponding insurance.  While courts and 
legislators must be wary of the uncertainty in applying existing tort doctrine 
to new innovation, a solution lies in enterprise-liability-like theories of 
recovery—originally imagined for automobile liability—that incorporate 
principles of strict and vicarious liability coupled with no-fault insurance.  
This proposal creates a socially optimal outcome that appropriately spreads 
losses, compensates victims, establishes expectations, and encourages 
future innovation. 
